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Personality
WHILST the doctrine of evolution, as applying in an optimistic
sense to all things and events within the Universe, can hardly
be said to have been quite definitely established it must be admitted
that the heavy balance of scientific opinion is in its favor. Such
application will, throughout this essay, be assumed, and especially
will this be so with reference to the world of life and growth. Evo-
lution, therefore, will be regarded as a process within which real
qualitative differences arise, and of which the tendency is to produce
results that are qualitatively higher than are their apparent start-
ing-points.
Having said this much, it seems natural to attempt to make clear
what should be understood by "personality." Such an attempt is
attended by grave difficulties. In a world of which, in spite of all
our boasted advances, we really know extremely little, some things
have still to be accepted rather than explained. Among such, psy-
chical individuality, which comes in the experience which we call
personality to so sharp a focus, is an outstanding example. This
much we can afford to admit, whilst at the same time denying that
we are quite without any significant knowledge bearing in this
direction.
To describe personality in terms purely physical or mental, is
a patent impossibility. A person may be pre-eminently mind ; but
the fact still remains that he is body as well. Nor do we know that
under any conditions he could be mind alone. So far as our knowl-
edge serves us, the body which is organic to mind is indispensable,
alike to the growth of that mind, and to its mature functioning. We
know of no exceptions. Even granting the existence of Divine,
which is perhaps Universal, Mind, the entire material universe may
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well be organic to it. Keeping such reflections as these steadily in
view, we need not fear to assert that the mind of personality is of
greater significance than is its body. The seed, the blade, the ear
are alike necessary ; but it is the full corn in the ear for which we
crave, and it is for this that the soil is tilled and the seed sown.
It might be thought a short-cut to take mind as being equivalent
to awareness or consciousness. To do so, however, would be to
describe the mind of personality in beggarly inadequate terms. How
far down in the scale of existence awareness is to be found is debat-
able: if we take into liberal account all instances of organic response
to the stimuli of the environment, we shall indeed have to go very
far. Again, the personal mind is characterized not only by con-
sciousness but also by inferential conditions, some dynamic, others
relatively static, which are usually referred to what we call, for want
of a better term, subconsciousness. But yet again, the human mind
is almost certainly not alone with respect to the possession of such
structures and processes. It is in the consciousness which is also
self-consciousness that the mind of personality may be said to come
into its own—in the consciousness which implies distinctions, syn-
theses, and the emergence of values. A person can say "I," "Thou,"
and "We"
;
perchance he can also say "God," thus evidencing his
conception of a vaster and a more enduring unity than can be ex-
pressed in terms of any society of himself and his fellows. And the
more he realizes the meaning of the first three (at least) of these
terms and shapes his life accordingly, the more must we hold that
he is a person.
It was Boethius who defined a person as "the individual subsist-
ence of a rational nature." In his Gififord lectures on God and Per-
sonality, Mr. C. C. J. Webb, commenting on this definition, states
that he regards it "as the best, taking it all in all, that we have." To
assert, however, that mere rationality differentiates personal exist-
ence from other individual existences is to plunge blindly into error.
That not all animal reactions can safely be labelled instinctive—that
it is indeed the height of rashness to draw hard and fast lines of
demarcation in this connection—is evidenced by the fact that, as
Dr. Rivers so emphatically puts it, "the behavior of animals, even
such animals as the insects, which are regarded as pre-eminent pat-
terns of the instinctive, shows many features, such as adaptability to
unusual conditions, which can only be explained by qualities of the
same order as those belonging to intelligence." ^ It is, however, in
1 Instinct and the Unconscious, p. 40.
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the life of man that reason may be said not merely to work but to
make its bid for supremacy of directorship. To put the case briefly,
it is because this is so, and still more so because of the level of the
intelligence thus manifested, that human individuality is personality.
Viewing the matter thus, that mind at a certain level, associ-
ated, as we must never forget, with a certain bodily structure, be-
comes personality, we now have to ask if this entity is something
which exists in its own right. The body assuredly does not do so.
It is too dependent, not only on its mind, but on its material environ-
ment. Alike for its genesis, its growth, and its sustenance, it is
obviously in close necessary relationship with a world of material
objects. Nor is the mind in better case: it is dependent upon its
own proper body, upon other minds—upon, in fact, a mental and
material universe. The recognition of such facts as these renders
impossible the holding of any crude doctrine of realism on the one
hand or of idealism on the other. Neither as body nor as mind, nor
as both taken together in their concrete actuality, can personality
stand alone. It has its setting in a world. Thence it draws its inner
life, and its sustenance: thence it derives whatever value it may
possess.
Hitherto, we have spoken of personality in general terms. When
we come, however, to the uniqueness of individuality possessed by
any particular person—an aspect which no survey of personality,
even so brief as is to present one, can afford to ignore—we are con-
fronted with the mystery of the Cosmos itself. We have every right
to be in earnest with the great principle, enunciated by Leibnitz, of
the identity of indiscernibles. But why are no two individuals pre-
cisely identical? Whence comes this all-marvellous uniqueness?
We cannot say. Nevertheless, is it not just here, in the heart of an
apparently insoluble mystery, that we must look for at least a por-
tion of personality's value? That friend whom we love—we love
none the less because he may chance to possess certain pleasing qual-
ities, but also because he is he. The good, the universal value, in a
person, is not something that can be legitimately abstracted from
that person's personality. Abstractions, whether of particulars or
of universals, move us but little. Concreteness makes an appeal that
is irresistible. Truth, beauty, goodness—these may have their eter-
nal reality ; yet what are they but for their embodiments ? In the
individuality of, let us say, a just, or a good, person, the universal
makes its appearance, and uniquely so, in the particular. Such
appearances challenge our immediate attention and response—as
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Felix knew, to his dismay, when in the presence of one who "rea-
soned of temperance, righteousness, and judgment to come." In
some way, within the life of each person, it would seem that the
universe itself finds, as it can do within no lower form of existence,
an individual, and unique expression. It would seem also to be ulti-
matelv to this fact that personality owes its charm, its mystery, and
its value.
Personality and its Inheritance
Assuming that the facts which have served as the data for evo-
lutionary theory have the right to be interpreted after an optimistic
fashion, it is fairly obvious that any attempt to explain the latter in
time in terms of the earHer is bound to result in grotesque failure.
To take a simple illustration—does the child explain the man? The
former has temporal priority, and. as a relative starting-point, is
necessary ; but to bring the latter into existence it takes a society of
living beings and an environment of natural objects. Nevertheless,
we cannot refuse to admit the fact that at however early a stage we
take the child, there is something there already. Any attempt to
throw light upon what that "something" is, involves the asking of
two questions : ( 1 ) What does a person owe to an ancestry admit-
tedly "human"? (2) Does he inherit also from non-human exist-
ence?
(1) That a person's body is a heritage from generations past and
gone, is evidenced by the simple facts that the germ-cell from which
it is evolved was formed by the conjugations of the spermatazoon
of the male-parent with the ovum of the female and that these in-
teracting cells were themselves derived from other and prior indi-
viduals. Thus our primal physical stuff is of racial tissue. Is it,
however, mere body that the individual inherits—mere body, pos-
sessing, in some inexplicable fashion, the power to urge the indi-
vidual in certain directions which are connected, in the first instance,
with the immediate care of the organism but which ultimately go
considerably further?
Along several lines we can argue that the overwhelming weight
of evidence is in favor of a negative answer.
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Firstly, we can point to the significant fact that the freshly-fertil-
ized germ-cell immediately starts to do the best it can with respect
to the situation created by itself plus its environment. It begins a
process of subdivision resulting in the production of many millions
of cells, each having its own place and function within a single
organism' which by means of specialized structures and systems of
organs can breathe, move, digest, and even think. We can attempt
to account for such creation and development by the assumption of
some directive power working at a level below what we usually call
consciousness, or by that of mechanism pure and simple ; and the
former assumption appears to risk less than does the latter. After
birth, what we may call, without too serious a risk of error, organic
consciousness, which, though it does not usually, at all events, enter
into the stream of ordinary consciousness, it is reasonable to sup-
pose is not discontinuous with the latter,- sees to it that the organ-
ism develops after a manner that has become stabilized by the long
working of the evolutionary process which has given to the human
body its present structures and functions, and sees to it also that
the organism, as a fully developed affair, is, barring accidents and
various inroads of disease, maintained at a sufficiently high level of
efficiency. Nor can we, it would appear, do otherwise than suppose
that it is this same directive and organizing principle that has been
operative from the first.
Secondly, with respect to the instincts—these, together with bod-
ily structures and functions, appear to constitute the most strongly-
marked features of the individual's ancestral inheritance. That
behavior has its root in instinct, appears impossible to deny.
"Directly or indirectly," writes Professor McDougall, in his Social
Psychology, "instincts are the prime-movers of all human activity.
. . . Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful
impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of
any kind ; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clock-
work whose mainspring had been removed, or a steam-engine whose
fires had been withdrawn. These impulses are the mental forces
that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies, and
in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life, mind,
and will." Further, our instincts manifest themselves, one and all,
as psycho-physical processes. And by a psycho-physical process
we mean that the psychical aspect is relevant and not merely inciden-
2 As evidenced bv such facts, to go no further, as those relating to "mental
healing."
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tal to the physical one.^ Aloreover, psycho-physical processes would
appear to imply psycho-physical dispositions, and suggestions of
continuity would certainly seem to point to the hypothesis that such
dispositions of double aspect must in some way be attributed to the
individual's primal germ-cell. Thus, again, the inference is clear
that the germ-cell is not capable of a purely physical explanation.
All biologists may be said to agree upon the thesis that evolution
depends upon heredity and variation. That the former factor, un-
derstood as implying the handing on of acquired modifications, plays
so important a part as was assigned to it by Lamarck and Spencer,
the Neo-Darwinian school has made it impossible for us to believe.
The broad fact of average individual regression towards average
racial qualities, as established by the statistical data of Pearson and
Galton, points in a similar direction, and at the same time serves as
a corrective to views which would make the conception of progress
too individualistic. We are not bound, it is true, to accept the view
that acquired modifications are in no sense or degree transmitted
;
if we do so, we are, indeed, faced with the difficulty of accounting
for any evolutionary progress. Neither are we bound to accept vari-
ation as being ultimately inexplicable in the sense of being entirely
independent of ancestral influences ; for in this connection the sug-
gestion of Galton that influences, if such act through several genera-
tions, may have a cumulative effect which manifests itself by giving
rise to an apparently sudden variation, is, after all, too significant
to be laid lightly on one side. The poini is that even if we accept,
as it seems that we should be wise to do, the main outlines of the
teaching of Neo-Darwinism, we are, nevertheless, strictly within
our rights in claiming that the primal germ-cell links us not only
physically but also mentally with the past. Our heritage is both
body and mind. That the latter is of the order of the "subconscious"
makes no difference in principle ; for the evidence, supplied by both
normal and abnormal psychology, to the effect that this is continuous
3 It has been claimed that there are instinctive bodily actions in which rele-
vant mentalitv (relevant in the sense of plavinR some part in the process) is
absent. But to admit some appreciation of the situation, which is expressed by
appropriate bodily action, seems to offer more continuity and to raise fewer
difficulties as one deals with a subject which is not too amenable to psychologi-
cal treatment. Such views as those to which we are referring pushed to their
logical conclusions, would lead us to regard instinctive bodily actions as being
merely more complicated forms of reflex actions. Yet, even so, it is difficult
to see how the psychical side (implying something more than mere awareness
of the action itself) is to be altogether ruled out; for in such cases we can
regard it as being subconscious rather than conscious.
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with "clear" consciousness, is too abundant and weighty to be
ignored.
(2) The tide of Hfe is to be regarded, from a thorough-going
evolutionist point of view, as being continuous from the amoeba to
man, and possibly—though here we are on very uncertain ground
—
from the inorganic to the organic. As we pause to reflect on the
continuity thus suggested, we cannot but realize something of its
tremendous significance. We see life in connection with organisms
so lowly that it would appear that what is usually termed conscious-
ness cannot by any stretch of the imagination be held to have lot or
part ; and yet, even here, there appears to be awareness of environ-
ment, adaptation, response. Again, as we pass higher up the scale,
in the lives of non-human living creatures we are confronted with
manifestations which we cannot refrain from calling behavior,
although such is for the most part at the level of instinct. With
regard to no phase of life-manifestation do we appear to be justified
in speaking of absolute unconsciousness, only of degrees of con-
sciousness or of difference of mind-level. It is, however, as we
have already suggested, in the life of man that consciousness may
be said to come into its own ; and on the significance of this fact the
enlightened upholder of evolutionary continuity will lay sufficient
emphasis to bring him into companionable proximity to the staunch-
est upholder of the hypothesis of "breaks." When this conscious-
ness appears, it undoubtedly comes on the top of much that has
gone before, and from which it has in no real sense severed its con-
nection. How far, however, we are indebted to a possible non-
human ancestry, is difficult to say. Certain displays of the subcon-
scious, for example, those associated with telepathy and with dis-
sociations of personality, may conceivably be held to have their
origin in instinctive reactions of animal ancestors. The latter phe-
nomena, as Dr. Rivers very significantly suggests,* may link us with
individual creatures which had occasion to make repeated and fun-
damental changes in their environment. Within the limits of this
present article, however, we can hardly pursue such speculations at
greater length. It is sufficient to say that behind man is a past of
life and energy that is incalculable. If, here and there, he is linked
to it by fetters, he yet owes it infinitely more than he knows.
That the individual, newly-arrived on the world's stage of
thought and action, is equipped with physical material and with cer-
tain general and particular tendencies to behavior which are, how-
* Instinct and the Unconscious, p. 80.
PERSONALITY AND EVOLUTION 105
ever we view the matter, a heritage from his complete ancestry, we
have everv reason to admit. That the kind of individual he is to
be is irrevocably determined by these tendencies, we have, in spite
of the pronouncements of extreme adherents of Weismannism, every
right to deny. It is, or should be, a well-known fact that instincts
may be allowed to develop after an "all-or-none" fashion or may
be modified even to the point of practical repression. It is possible,
therefore, to accomplish much in the direction of encouraging the
instincts to develop after a systematic, orderly fashion, their indul-
gence being regulated by a system of valuations. This is brought
about by the acquisition of sentiments, the abiding feeling-attitudes
of the individual with respect to particular objects. It is only thus,
indeed, that instincts with their propelling emotions come fully into
the movement of our lives. Instincts are hereditary ; sentiments are
acquired characters. The importance of the formation of the latter
cannot be over-rated : and it is our social experience which makes
that formation possible. Let us repeat, the education of the senti-
ments is closely related to the acquisition of valuations. And our
valuations make us what we are. They tend to pass from the more
subjective order, connected with the immediate needs of the organ-
ism, to a more and more objective one. It is even thus, bv wav of
continuous progression, that we come at length to the conception of
goods that are intrinsic. In this process, the part played by the en-
vironment appears to be enormous. Here, in our world of things
and persons, we see in the activities of others the working out of
instincts similar to those which we ourselves possess. We see the
efforts of men attended bv failure and bv success ; and the lessons
implied therein we are able to some extent to learn and to turn to
our advantage. \\'e are beckoned here, warned or sternly forbid-
den there :^ we act and are acted upon. It is as we make acquain-
tance with the customs, institutions and traditions—which mav be
said to mark the self-consciousness of the race-life—of our social
"universe"—as we breathe, in fact, the whole spiritual atmosphere
in which our beings are bathed—that we are enabled to become per-
sons as distinct from individuals. It is, therefore, in the environ-
ment that we have to seek for that portion of our inheritance which
we most highly value—a portion, indeed, which is not lightly entered
upon, but which has to be bought with a great price.
^ We violate the laws of nature and of morality at our peril. There are.
indeed, in respect to each of these, important senses in which violation is
impossible.
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Personality and the Future
The consciousness that shows itself within personality must mark
for us, from one point of view, a climax of mental evolution. But
to it we dare not ascribe finality. Organic awareness, and the be-
havior that is dictated by instinct, with its marvellous power of
response, have given pride of place to the controlling power of rea-
son—reason which pursues its hesitating way with errors not a
few, but which yet has an infinite capacity of development. The
line of that development we may perhaps endeavor to forecast, tak-
ing the main indications, as we find them in a survey of mind's
evolution, as consisting in the harmonious development of capacities
inherent in personality's very nature. This, after all, is only the
old idea, familiar to us since Aristotle, of the passage from the
potential to the actual. Such potentiality must, however, be re-
ferred to more than the mere individual existent ; and such passage,
whilst it is necessarily difficult and hazardous, is aided by the re-
sources of an infinite Universe. To put our thought in yet other
words, the line of advance is from subconsciousness to self-con-
sciousness, taking the latter term in its fullness of meaning, and
thereby implying a conscious filling of one's proper place in a world
which is nothing less than the ultimate Cosmos.
It has been suggested, e. g., by such writers as Bradley and
Bosanquet, that the advance of finite personality must ultimately
involve personality's dissolution in the sense of being irremediably
lost in that which is higher than itself. It is doubtful, however, if
such an idea is really necessitated even by an Absolutist meta-
physic. It is also doubtful if experience furnishes us with suf-
ficiently impressive analogies in support of the contention that per-
sonality is essentially adjectival to some greater individual. Bosan-
quet, writing in this connection,® lays great emphasis upon the social
analogy. The human person, he rightly contends, is, apart from the
social whole, but an abstraction ; for the state is a more comprehen-
sive individual than is any single person. This, one would hardly
wish to gainsay. But most certain it is that the counter-fact also
remains, that the State, apart from its individual members, has no
^'Principle of Indwidualify and Value, Chap. viii.
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life that it can call its own. The social analogy, one would not seek
to deny, has great significance for such a view as Bosanquet's on
the relation in which finite selves stand to the Absolute ; but never-
theless it appears to have still more significance for other points of
view which, recognizing to the full the uniqueness of personality,
claim that to the part played by a person within the Absolute no
theory of adjectivity can possibly do adequate justice. It is open to
us to contend that the indications provided by the field of experi-
ence to which we are now alluding point to the conclusion that indi-
viduality of personality and social unity advance and recede pari-
passu. It is surely no fusion of lesser individuals that the concep-
tion of the State indicated or demands, but the bringing of many
and diverse gifts into one common service. It is thus that each indi-
vidual, if he only will, can perform a task which, just because he is
he, none other could perform so well ; and, in so doing, sustains, and
is sustained by, that which is greater than himself.
The case for the supporters of an adjectival theory of person-
ality is admittedly not exhausted by the illustration just criticized.
It will, however, be found that the principles implied in that criti-
cism are capable of a sufficiently wide application.
Personality is something which, in actual experience, shows itself
fractionally, and in greater or less degree. We cannot, therefore,
suppose that persons, as we see them, are otherwise than as yet in
the making. It is obvious that we cannot point to any level, or
stage, as being final. All of which can only mean that what per-
sonality is capable of becoming, or, in other words, really is, is
something on in front—in the nature of an ideal rather than an
actuality. It is when we turn to a consideration of the world's great
individuals or persons that we get a glimpse of the heights to which
personality is capable of ascending. It is towards such individuals
as these that we must direct our gaze if we desire to have vision of
what personality may become in its uniqueness and yet concrete
universality. Our highest ideals—truth, beauty, goodness—are with
personality inextricably interwoven. These, whilst they cannot be
said to depend for their being upon the part played by persons
in isolation from the action of the rest of the Universe, nevertheless
depend in a very special sense upon persons to appreciate them and
to give them efifect in the w^orld of Becoming. Their progressive
attainment, it would seem, demands individual knowledge, feeling
and conation, of the kind which we can only call personal, together
with social co-operation amid a responsive cosmic environment.
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Reasoning thus, and bringing together the threads of our foregoing
arguments, we shall surely find it infinitely more intelligible and
stimulating to regard the future evolution of finite mind as pro-
ceeding within personality rather than as involving a non-reversible
passage of personality with some form of existence higher and other
than itself.
As we survey the wide fields of psychology, biology, and phil-
osophy, we are not without indications that the human individual
is better equipped for his further upward journey than he commonly
realizes. At the extent of his capacities of mental storage and cre-
ation we can but dimly guess ; we only know that it far exceeds
what we have commonly supposed. We are only just beginning
to suspect that through the uncharted areas of his "subconscious-
ness" the human person is not merely connected with his racial past
but also with a present environment of inconceivable immensity. To
put the matter in few and closing words, we see, within the life of
personality, indications of powers that suggest with respect to per-
sonality itself vast possibilities
—
possibilities of immeasurably in-
creased scope of thought and action and of a nearer approach to
ideals that belong to an eternal world of reality. Further than this,
it is difficult and unsafe to speculate : but most certain it is that
when we speak of personality we can give to this idea no more than
a partial content. For, to use the oft-quoted words of T. H. Green,
"it is only little by little, as we gain fuller knowledge of the soul's
capacities, that we can give the idea of self-realization its filling."
And by "self-realization" must be understood that personality which
is progressively attained by way of evolution.
